



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 10

## New Hope for Disarmament?

by William R. Frye

UNITED NATIONS—Is the way now open to disengagement of Soviet and American forces along the power frontiers of Europe?

This is the critical question left unanswered by a somewhat inconclusive disarmament debate in the United Nations General Assembly in January. Both the United States and the Soviet Union put forward blueprints; These were discussed in preliminary fashion in the Assembly and will now be analyzed in detail in the five-nation Disarmament Subcommittee.

No one is talking publicly about "disengagement" as such. The real issues in disarmament negotiations are rarely made explicit. But this is obviously in the back of the minds of both sides. The Soviet Union broadly hinted at this on November 17 when it proposed a 1,000-mile belt down the middle of Central Europe—a belt in which occupation troops would be thinned out and over which photographic reconnaissance planes would be allowed to fly. Once the Red Army was thinned out in the satellite empire, the Kremlin's political control would obviously vanish with it. Hungary proved that. Thus the Soviet Union was in effect offering to neutralize—to "Finland-ize" or "Austria-ize"—Central Europe.

Such an arrangement is habitually criticized in the United States by official government spokesmen, in part, no doubt, out of deference to the views of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of Germany. It is known, however, that during the summer of 1956 an American withdrawal from continental Europe in return for a Soviet withdrawal from the satellite empire was seriously considered by the National Security Council. The idea eventually was rejected as an unequal bargain, but it was kept on a back shelf in case changed circumstances altered the power equation in Europe.

The equation was drastically changed by the Hungarian revolt of October-December 1956. This revolt increased the willingness of the Soviet Union to negotiate a withdrawal. It could be logically reasoned that the Hungarian crisis should have had the opposite effect; actually it produced a high degree of willingness—even eagerness—to bargain. The Kremlin may have felt that it was now or never; that if the Soviet Union did not trade off the satellite empire for worthwhile concessions from the West, it might never be able to do so.

This same possibility was used in Wash-

FEBRUARY 1, 1957

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED  
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ton to oppose negotiation. On the one hand, it was said, why pay a price to obtain what we might get for nothing, simply by waiting? But on the other hand, if we waited, and the empire did not collapse—if the Kremlin, by a return to Stalin's tactics, restored order—our bargaining position would have deteriorated, not improved. And if events got wholly out of hand, and the empire collapsed in a fury of bloodshed, a desperate, off-balance Kremlin might conceivably go beyond the "point of no return"—that is, might set in motion a series of events leading to World War III. A second Hungary in East Germany, for example, would be especially dangerous for the West.

The United States therefore went into the UN General Assembly with a new disarmament plan. This plan did not touch directly on disengagement. But it served as a countermove in the bargaining process. The Soviet Union had asked as its price for abandonment of the satellite empire a corresponding American abandonment of our overseas bases, including, notably, NATO. No such step could be contemplated unless the world were a much safer place in which to live; so the United States offered the broad outlines of a plan which would help to make it safe. Details were left to be unveiled in the subcommittee.

### 'Open Skies' Limited

The most spectacular elements of the new blueprint are curbs on guided missiles and other objects designed for use in outer space. But to

disarmament experts the most significant feature is that the American "early-warning system"—the inspection system designed to eliminate surprise from atomic warfare—has been made negotiable by the downgrading of aerial inspection. "Open skies," for the first time, is not an essential precondition, a "gateway"; nor need it cover the entire United States and Soviet Union from the beginning. It may begin in a smaller area. In some respects this plan parallels what the Russians themselves have proposed—namely, that a small area, a 1,000-mile zone of Central Europe, be the locale for aerial photography.

The United States plan for security also includes (1) a "freeze" on nuclear stockpiles, thus halting the atomic armaments race and keeping small countries from getting the bomb; and (2) an agreement to begin small-scale reductions of conventional armaments without insisting on airtight inspection at the outset. Thus three principal security problems of our time have been attacked: There is an effort to prevent the "big" war, whether waged with missiles or with old-fashioned jet bombers; there is a parallel effort to keep small wars from becoming atomic; and there is a first step toward ending the conventional-armaments race. The United States implies that in this context it is ready to approach the major outstanding political problems and especially those of Central Europe.

Logically the two plans, Russian and American, should have set off

a meaningful process of negotiation. What took place, however, was not much more than a series of tentative diplomatic feelers, questions and approaches, interspersed amid propaganda speeches. The answers to the questions, when they were forthcoming, were indirect and inconclusive. Bargaining positions were modified only slightly, when at all. The basic question—the feasibility of disengagement—was not answered.

In part this was because of allied disunity. At least two of the allies, Britain and France, which at times in the past have deplored American "rigidity," themselves were holding back just at the time when the United States was ready to move ahead. Allied differences were papered over for the sake of public appearances; but observers who followed what went on behind the scenes knew that Britain, which had not yet built the bomb stockpile it wanted, was resisting the "freeze" on such stockpiles, and even France was privately expressing reluctance to sign away all future rights to build the bomb.

Nothing basic having been settled by the UN Assembly debate, the whole problem is being referred to the five-nation subcommittee, which meets in private. The only clear conclusion is that the context of disarmament negotiations has changed. Old patterns of thought and action are being broken, and new opportunities, together with new obstacles, are emerging.

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Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 E. 46th St., New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • MRS. W. HOUSTON KENYON, JR. • JOHN MARSHALL • PHILIP E. MOSELY • PAUL H. NITZE • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE • ANNA LORD STRAUSS. JOHN W. NASON, President; VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor; NEAL STANFORD, Washington Contributor; FELICE SOLOMON, Assistant Editor. • The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors. • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.



## Scope of Eisenhower Doctrine

The Eisenhower Doctrine, presented by the President at the special session of Congress on January 5, has been compared to the Monroe Doctrine, to the Truman Doctrine, to our Formosa policy, to a new Baghdad pact. It is really none of these. It is not a policy to keep the Russians out of the Middle East, for they are already there. It is rather a policy to keep the Russians from taking over the Middle East.

It is not a military alliance, for we are not promising to help any country in particular. There is no second party to the Eisenhower Doctrine. It is not mutual, bilateral or multilateral—and according to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles it is not even unilateral. The United States, Mr. Dulles has explained, will use military force to stop overt Soviet aggression in the area, but only if the victim asks for help and only if the United Nations does not act. If the Communists can take over a Middle East state peacefully, the United States is not going to move in and unseat the Red regime. But the doctrine's intent is to stave off open aggression and make covert subversion risky.

### Three-Part Doctrine

The Eisenhower Doctrine is divided into three parts: (1) the assurance of military help, if requested, against Communist aggression; (2) the promise of arms and military planning to strengthen local security forces; and (3) the promise of economic aid to make communism less attractive to the peoples of the Middle East.

It is Mr. Dulles' conviction that these three things will prevent both

overt aggression and covert subversion by the Communists. The first will keep the Red Army from moving; the second and third will keep Russian rubles from winning Middle East peoples. Mr. Dulles believes that Czechoslovakia would not have fallen if Prague had had assurance on the first point and that there would have been no Korean war if Seoul had been covered by the Eisenhower Doctrine.

It is important to note—and this has been generally missed—that the doctrine is aimed at "international communism"—not at sovietism or national communism. If Syria pulls a "Guatemala," the United States is not going to move in; it is up to the Syrians to decommunize themselves. The Red Army will have to move before the United States Marines are ordered to move.

The Administration, it should be recognized, faces a tough issue in its arms aid program. The President mentioned "military assistance programs" for any nation or group of nations "which desire such aid." Such aid, it is understood, is to be used against Communist aggression, not to settle regional differences. Yet the principal demand for arms in this area—from both Arabs and Israelis—is for the latter purpose. Israel, as might be expected, is most anxious to get arms under this new promise. And the Baghdad pact nations—Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq—now have a formal invitation to seek arms from Washington.

Some observers here say that the Eisenhower Doctrine is a means of taking the United States into the Baghdad pact, which it cannot join openly because of inter-Arab dis-

putes and the membership of Britain, which is unpopular in Iraq since its Suez action. As the Red Army would have to move down through at least some of the "northern tier" of states forming the Baghdad pact (specifically Turkey and Iran) to reach any Middle East region, the United States promise to employ armed force in case of a Red Army attack is in a sense tantamount to joining the pact. True, Turkey and Iran would have to ask for help if attacked—but no one here doubts they would. The program envisaged in the Eisenhower Doctrine also promises military assistance (that is, arms, equipment and technicians) to "any group of nations" desiring it. There is, again, little doubt that Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan—the Baghdad group—desire such aid.

It is important to remember one thing, and the President has emphasized this: the new American formula for the Middle East, while dealing with the most calamitous eventuality, covers only the crisis which is least anticipated. Few, if any, in Washington expect the Red Army to march into the Middle East, although everyone expects continued covert Soviet subversive activity. What is feared is not a Red Army move, but trouble over Suez or between the Arab states and Israel. And President Eisenhower made it clear to Congress that his program does not cover these problems. He said: "This does not represent the totality of our policies in the area." It does not cover Suez, Israel, Arab refugees. On these issues specific policies will presumably be developed in the future.

NEAL STANFORD



## U.S.—For or Against 'Colonialism'?

The colonialism debate, which dates back to the origins of the American Republic, has been given new impetus by the Suez and Hungarian crises.

Many Americans who had felt uneasy at seeing the United States linked in world affairs to Europe's colonial powers, past or present, welcomed the opportunity for dissociating this country from Britain and France in the Suez episode, which was regarded as a throwback to pre-20th-century diplomacy. At the same time, American spokesmen pointed out that whatever the errors committed by Western colonial nations, Russia has displayed far greater ruthlessness in trying to maintain a grip on its own shaken empire of satellites.

This renewed debate has brought out two important points. First, as the United States assumes larger and still larger commitments around the globe, Americans are becoming less harsh in their judgments of "colonialism." The former tendency to assume that every dependent people which seeks independence has had a political experience similar to that of the Western Europeans who settled here before the American Revolution and should automatically be granted self-determination or self-government has been modified by the events of the postwar decade.

The rapid spread of nationalism, some Americans feel, has brought not stability but unrest and even near-chaos in many areas of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. A "go-slow" policy toward independence movements is therefore regarded in some instances as desirable to safeguard America's far-flung interests.

And as Americans have gone overseas to carry out economic and technical aid programs they have become aware that Europe's colony-owning powers had not just exploited the resources of their native subjects but had practiced, with little fanfare, effective Point Four programs of their own. In short, Americans who had been brought up to react automatically against colonialism have acquired a longer historical perspective.

Second—and at first sight this may seem contradictory—we have become more keenly aware of what it is that makes colonialism untenable in the 20th century, whatever the contributions it may have made in the past. We now see that colonialism may take many forms—territorial control, political domination, economic privileges, attempts to impose ideologies or religious faiths from the outside. In essence, however, colonialism, whatever its precise form, represents an unequal relationship between strong and weak, advanced and backward. Such a relationship might have been regarded by all concerned as tolerable, perhaps beneficial, in ages when authoritarianism was viewed, even by such spokesmen of Western democracy as John Stuart Mill, as properly applicable to "barbarians."

But liberty, once implanted at home, cannot be made to stop at the water's edge. Colonialism practiced by a democracy becomes a paradox, which must sooner or later be resolved by democratization of the once unequal relationship between white and nonwhite, ruler and ruled.

This process of adjustment, in the midst of which we are living, is painful for both sides. It involves profound political and economic changes

around the globe. But above all it requires profound changes in the attitudes of both sides—notably the assertion of superiority, often unconscious, of Westerners in non-Western areas, and the acute nationalism of peoples newly independent or still seeking independence which often takes the form of anti-Westernism.

### Changes in Attitudes

On both sides the process of change produces legitimate grievances. These have been summed up with powerful effect by Nicholas Monsarrat in his novel, *The Tribe That Lost Its Head*, about the conflict between British colonial administrators and tribal chieftains on an imaginary island off the coast of Africa. The British deplore the cruelties of some of the Africans in their efforts to oust the white man. The African protagonist lists his objections briefly as: "Being treated like a child all the time. Being patronized."

Although four-fifths of the people who were under colonial rule before World War II have now achieved independence or full self-government, the "colonial problem" persists. What can or should the United States, with its limited and unique experience of colonialism, do in this period of turmoil?

Dr. Cornelis W. de Kiewiet, president of the University of Rochester and a leading authority on Africa, testifying on November 28 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on foreign policy and mutual security, suggested three approaches.

First, he said, our problem in colonial areas is not the avoidance of unsettlement, but "the direction the

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# Roots of Indonesian Conflict

by Frank N. Trager

Dr. Trager is research professor of government in charge of the Southeast Asia Program at New York University. He was formerly Point Four director in Burma and revisited Southeast Asia during 1956. He is the author of "Burma: Land of Golden Pagodas," *Headline Series* No. 104, March-April 1954, and coauthor and editor of *Burma* (New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1956, 3 vols.).

Predictions about the short-run Indonesian events resulting from the Sumatra crisis which developed on December 22 are hazardous. In the past the extraordinary popularity of President Sukarno has carried him, if not his cabinet, through equally serious hazards. But other crises were largely confined to Java or to relations between Java and one or more of the lesser islands (e.g. Java and Sulawesi, or Java and Amboina). This time, however, Bung Sukarno, a Javanese, has to deal with all of Sumatra and, as on several previous occasions, with the Army.

### Army vs. Prime Minister

The immediate conflict appears to be between large sections of the Army stationed in Sumatra and the government of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo. In August 1955 the Army had forced the resignation of his cabinet. The parliamentary elections (September 29-November 15, 1955) returned the prime minister's Nationalist party (PNI) to power, and him to the head of government in a coalition cabinet which took office in March 1956.

There were in fact two elections: one for Parliament with 260 seats, the other for a constitution-drafting Constituent Assembly with 520 seats. The vote (in millions) for the Parliament gave the following results: the Nationalist party (PNI), 8.4; the Masjumi (a Muslim) party, 7.9; the Nahdatul Ulama (Council of Muslim Teachers), 6.9; the Communists (PKI), 6.1. The PNI and Masjumi each received 57 seats; the NU, 45; the PKI, 39. The remaining seats

were divided among 24 smaller parties, several of which—the Parkindo (Christian), the Catholic, and the United Muslim (PSII)—were also represented in the cabinet, which is composed of a sprinkling of these parties and 5 each from the PNI, Masjumi and NU. The PKI supports the cabinet but is not in it. Its support, however, is mainly for Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo and the PNI.

The Sumatran conflict appears to indicate that the Army has renewed its feud with the prime minister. During his present tenure of office the army openly acknowledged that it engaged in rubber and copra smuggling in order to increase its defense budget. The Army, moreover, embarrassed the prime minister by arresting his foreign minister, Ruslan Abdulgani, on the morning he was to leave for the August 1956 Suez conference in London. And it attempted an abortive coup in Jakarta during November 1956 led by a popular figure, Colonel Z. Lubis, who is now in hiding.

### Crisis in Sumatra

The events reported in the press since December 20 brought this festering situation to a head. The army in Central Sumatra, led by Lt. Col. Ahmed Hussein, demanded regional autonomy and abolition of centralized government. The North Sumatra command followed into opposition, led by Colonel M. Simbolon, who has since been displaced by his subordinate, Lt. Col. D. Gintings, in deference to Jakarta's order. However, Colonel Simbolon es-

aped, and North Sumatra is by no means under the control of the central authorities. In quick succession the South Sumatra province announced it would block further transfer to the central government of its foreign exchange earnings, which account for approximately 70 percent of the country's total. On the last day of 1956 President Sukarno proclaimed a state of war and siege. This move, together with earlier presidential proclamations, means that virtually all Sumatra is temporarily out of control. However, there has as yet been no bloodletting between troops or between Jakarta and Sumatra, and none is expected.

If this conflict were merely between the Army or portions of the Army and a prime minister of a coalition cabinet it would not be difficult to resolve. But, despite the fact that the Army brought about the fall of the first Sastroamidjojo government and will help to precipitate the downfall of the present cabinet, the prime minister is not the real target of the Army's disaffection. True, he is its victim; but the issues are larger, more significant, than either the personality or the politics of the prime minister.

When I was in Indonesia during the summer of 1956 mounting rumors of this dangerous conflict were heard on all sides. At that time the present government was not expected to survive for long. It was publicly known that the second most powerful figure in Jakarta, Vice President Mohammed Hatta (he is the cosigner with President Sukarno of the Indonesian proclamation of in-

dependence of August 17, 1945), was going to resign his office because of dissatisfaction with the government. Since then Hatta has resigned, and his Masjumi party (which withdrew from the cabinet on January 10) together with some smaller cabinet parties has called for the dissolution of the present cabinet. Then as now, the central government was aware that it had not fulfilled its promises to Sumatra and other island provinces with respect to internal economic development, resettlement of people, communications, roads, transport and so on. Growing dissatisfaction with internal affairs—there is no basic conflict over Indonesia's foreign policy of neutralism and nonalignment in the present world situation—was not to be stilled. Its eruption into a crisis was predicted. That the crisis took place in Sumatra is due to the fact that this island has long provided Indonesia with a high level of nationalist leadership.

### Causes of Eruption

Here it is possible to do no more than list the major items which caused the eruption:

1. *Personality and political role of the president.* Bung Sukarno would win in any open political vote in Indonesia. He is deservedly a hero to the masses for his magnificent struggle for Indonesian independence. However, his guiding philosophy, freely expressed, is to keep nationalist political agitation going at every level. This, he says, he does in order to weld the 3,000 islands and the 80 million people composing the Indonesian state into a *nation*, with a national ethos and patriotism. Indonesia's agitation over West Irian—a part of New Guinea which is held by the Netherlands—as an illustration of former colonialism; Indonesia's role as host to 28 other nations at the Bandung conference in

April 1955; Sukarno's triumphant visits to the United States, the U.S.S.R., Communist China and other countries of North America and Europe—all these are designed to increase the people's national *amour-propre*.

### Role of Sukarno

Sukarno is technically a "ceremonial" president in a parliamentary democracy headed by a prime minister, but more often than not he tends to be his own prime and foreign ministers. He is actively interested in setting a policy, although less inclined to take on the responsibility of the practical, laborious daily tasks of executing it. His emphasis is on politics, not on economics. This emphasis, in turn, serves as a pattern for other Indonesians. Since Sukarno's labors for Indonesia have been and continue to be prodigious, there is little disposition to criticize him publicly for his deficiencies in internal matters. As a result, "his" prime minister, Sastroamidjojo, "takes" the attacks made on the government.

2. *Character of cabinets.* No Indonesian political party has yet achieved a commanding majority. Hence government in Indonesia has been a series of coalitions, with the inherent weakness of such arrangements. Cabinets have come and gone with a rapidity exceeded, if at all, only by those of postwar France. Unlike France, however, Indonesia has a relatively young, inexperienced bureaucracy, which tends to be stultified, and is certainly not improved, by the frequent changes of cabinets. Once again, political decisions, particularly on the international level, can and do get made, but economic planning and development lag.

3. *Character of the evolving nation.* It is at this point that Sumatra re-enters the picture. This richest

island of Indonesia has a population of about 3 million, compared to Java's 54 million. It is a place for internal resettlement from the overpopulated islands. But Sumatra, like the other islands, feels neglected and economically deprived by the central government located in Jakarta. It is proud of the fact, as indicated above, that so many of its sons have given leadership to nationalist Indonesia. Names of Sumatrans, such as those of Hadji Agus Salim, Hatta, Sjahrir and Natsir are widely known.

### Federalism Issue

Moreover, Sumatra, thinking in terms of the constitution now being drafted by the Constituent Assembly, is worried by President Sukarno's emphasis on a "unitary" or "centralized" instead of a "federal" state. It wants some kind of a federal structure in spite of the fact that this term was made unpopular by the Dutch. The president, moreover, has recently been speaking in terms of having "one party" only, instead of Indonesia's 28. He seems to envisage a group such as Nehru's Congress party in India or Burma's Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League coalition party. But Sumatra, along with Sulawesi (Celebes), gives majority support to the Masjumi party. It has no desire to be swallowed up politically by the more secular PNI of Bung Sukarno.

The Sumatrans wish to preserve a number of autonomies as a "state" or "province" in the Indonesian nation. The Javanese, who for the most part support the president, are historically suspicious of the Sumatrans. They regard them as "too able" or "too smart" or "too enterprising" or something "too much." This is not just a rivalry of "states within a union." Rather it is an aspect of deeper-seated ethnocentric attitudes which have not yet been submerged in a national union.

This is a problem which no Indonesian whom I have met would deny but which, as far as I have discovered, no Indonesian studies or works at in terms of social therapy. Its "solution" is frequently advanced in terms of Indonesian antagonism to foreigners, notably the Chinese, who number approximately 2 million. This ethnocentric feeling caused a leading member of the Socialist party (PSI) to say to me that if the PSI is to succeed it must, among other things, replace its Sumatran leadership with Javanese.

4. *The Communists.* On the subject of Communists the Army, the Masjumi party and the Socialists see eye to eye. They have not forgotten the armed Communist (PKI) rebellion of September 1948. They believe that President Sukarno and the PNI may not have forgotten, but are seemingly too ready to forgive, the Communists. They disapprove of the PNI accepting PKI support. They are keenly aware that the PKI political campaign of 1955 made the Masjumi the focal point of attack—an attack from which the PNI, as a contesting party, benefited even if not welcoming it. In short, there is some serious fear that the group surrounding the president—the PNI—is failing to deal wisely with the indigenous Communists—a failing not found in other "neutralist" Asian countries such as India and Burma.

5. *The economy.* There is a general uneasiness in Indonesia over the failure of the central government, under whatever cabinet, to advance the economic development of Indonesia in terms of its genuine capabilities and great natural resources, in which it ranks third after the United States and U.S.S.R. This uneasiness has been intensified by widespread notice of proved scandal, corruption and inefficiency in high places, and by economic measures


helping the few instead of the many.

These five factors do not exhaust Indonesia's problem, but they point up its major components.

What, then, are the prospects for Indonesia? As already indicated, the Sastroamidjojo government is doomed. Unfortunately, even by conservative estimate, the Constituent Assembly will not complete its constitutional labors until 1958, at the earliest. Hence the governmental structural question will continue to be a topic of agitation. Obviously, President Sukarno must seek a compro-

ties. Other than personalities—which in Indonesia play as great a role as elsewhere in the world—there are no obstacles to these two compromises. Amalgamation and coalition along these lines—always assuming the exclusion of the Communists—could go far to save Indonesia from further strife. They would give a stable government a chance to run the country in the interests of all the islands, and of all the people.

Since the conflict described here is essentially a conflict among the top, or "elite," groups in Indonesia, it



mise on both the structural and party questions. He, together with Hatta, Natsir, Sjahrir and the leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama can solve both the question of the nature of the Indonesian state and the kind of political party system the state shall have.

### Possible Adjustments

There is little doubt that the Indonesian state must have some kind of federal structure. On this point Sukarno needs to yield. With respect to the party system, it would be logical and possible, on the one hand, for the PNI and the PSI to join as secular parties, and on the other, for the several Muslim parties to unite under the moderate and wise leadership of Hatta. Such a development would, on the whole, support Sukarno's view about the need for reducing the number of political par-

ties. The handful of leaders who shape the destinies of this extraordinary archipelago are fortunate in that the overwhelming rural masses are industrious, hardworking, attractive, captivating people who conduct their lives in time-honored fashion, waiting with amazing patience for the improvements which they have been promised, which they richly deserve, and which a stable, independent, democratic Indonesia can provide.

READING SUGGESTIONS: George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1952); *Report on Indonesia*, Special Issue, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Washington, D.C., Embassy of Indonesia, August-September 1956); W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague, W. van Hoeve, 1956, distributed in U.S. by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York); Dorothy Woodman, *The Republic of Indonesia* (New York, Philosophical Library, 1955).

## Spotlight

(Continued from page 76)

unsettlement can take." We must understand the point of view of the inhabitants of these areas. "We have to force ourselves, far more than we normally do, to see the world as an Arab or a Kikuyu."

Second, "it is of the utmost importance that we work with the metropolitan powers, assuming, of course, that there is a basic agreement in principle between them and us on the trends to be followed and the final goals to be attained." The metropolitan powers, he believes, "constitute part of the guarantee that developments will be orderly and within a Western democratic framework."

And third, we should talk, not in negative terms—not in terms of anti-colonialism—but in positive terms of "noncolonialism" or rather "in favor of peoples within the vacuum areas."

This is what President Eisenhower did in his Middle East message to Congress when he said: "Our country supports without reservation the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East."

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The fifth in a series of eight articles on "Decisions . . . 1957," a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



## FPA Bookshelf

### BOOKS ON ASIA

Robert Trumbull, former correspondent of *The New York Times* in India who is now stationed in Japan, gives a lively account of his experiences during a crucial period of India's transition from British rule to independent existence in *As I See India* (New York, Sloane, 1956, \$4.00). In *China Under Communism: The First Five Years* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955, \$4.50) Richard L. Walker, assistant professor of history at Yale, well known for his critical appraisals of the Chinese Communists, presents a carefully considered, well-documented analysis of developments on the China mainland since the coming to power of communism. An "Economic Survey of Communist China," by Yuan-Li Wu (New York, Bookman, 1956, \$12.50) is a balanced study, by a Chinese scholar now working at Stanford University, of the economic policies and activities of the Chinese Communists since 1949, important for an understanding of the development of a great Asian power whose experience is being closely watched by other underdeveloped areas of Asia, notably non-Communist India.

Ian Stephens, former British editor of *The Statesman* of Calcutta, one of India's most distinguished newspapers, reports on a journey through Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan in *Horned Moon* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1955, \$5.00), whose attractiveness is greatly enhanced by excellent photographs, some in color. Eustace Seligman, member of the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell and chairman of the board of the Foreign Policy Association, gives sound advice on *What the United States Can Do About India* (New York, New York University Press, 1956, \$2.95) in a brief but unusually thoughtful book. Some of the human problems that Americans face in understanding and communicating with the peoples of Asia are illustrated in a collection of vivid stories by Vern Sneider, author of the

world-famous *Teahouse of the August Moon*, in *A Long Way from Home* (New York, Putnam, 1956, \$3.50).

### UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

In *America at Mid-Century* (New York, Harcourt, 1955, \$5.75) the stimulating French authority on world politics and sociology, André Siegfried, author of the famous book, *America Comes of Age*, reassesses the American scene over 25 years later and analyzes the foundations of this country's foreign policy and its relations to world civilization. Another provocative volume is *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York, Harcourt, 1955, \$4.75) by Louis Hartz, associate professor of government at Harvard. His book compares and relates the development of democracy in this country to that of the West as a whole.

The influence of "one of the most powerful pressure groups on the national scene" and "how it operates to make or remake policies and laws relating to our foreign affairs" are revealed in *The American Legion and American Foreign Policy* (New York, Bookman, 1955, \$4.75) by Roscoe Baker, former professor of political science at New Mexico Highlands University and a Legionnaire. Although Dr. Baker has relied mainly on the Legion's own reports; he has also drawn on sources hostile to the Legion and on the *Congressional Record*.

A survey of American relations with all Asian countries from 1776 to 1955 is presented in *The United States and Asia* (New York, Praeger, 1955, \$5.00), by Dr. Lawrence H. Battistini, chief of the Economic Affairs Division of the Civil Historical Section of SCAP headquarters during the occupation of Japan and currently in Japan on a research grant from the Gotham Foundation. One episode in the history of this country's Asian relations is examined in *America's Siberian Expedition: 1918-1920* (Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1956, \$7.50) by Betty Miller Unterberger of Whittier College.

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